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I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike the antiquated system of posting a defamatory flier on a
signpost or publishing a slanderous article in the local newspaper, in
today's Internet era, a spiteful person may post defamatory information on
the Internet with great ease and anonymity, reaching a vastly larger
community.' The amorphous characteristics and constant expansion of the
Internet greatly increases the potential damage to one's reputation caused
by defamation while keeping the speaker relatively safe from liability. The
key, for electronic defamation tortfeasors, is the use of Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs") who allow persons to stealthily travel on the
information superhighway. As a response to this problem, defamation law,
which is largely common law and governed primarily by the States,4
entered the electronic realm in an attempt to curb the potential abuses of
information technology. Realizing a growing concern for cyber-
defamation, courts were willing to impart traditional common law tort
principles into the digital realm and hold ISPs liable as publishers.5 This
judicial intervention into the Internet directly conflicted with the continued
growth and unrestricted access to the knowledge and discourse available on
the Internet.
6
At the same time, the influx of Internet technology into the workplace
sparked immense debate among legal scholars regarding its potential
ramifications. Yet, these scholars focus minuscule attention on what impact
such technology will have on the traditional employer concern of
defamation suits.7 While "electronic mall ('e-mail') and Internet use in the
1. Bruce P. Smith, Cybersmearing and the Problem of Anonymous Online Speech,
COMM. LAW., Fall 2000, at 3-4.
2. Id. at 3. For an obvious example see Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F.
Supp. 2d 1069 (D.S.D. Sept. 27, 2001). In Kinko's, an unknown individual went to one of
defendant's stores, rented a computer with access to the Internet and defamed plaintiffs in a
chat room. Id. at 1070. Under this system, it is "possible for a Kinko's user to log onto the
Internet under a pseudonym, without fear that other Internet users will be able to trace his or
her online statements back to him or her in the real world." Id.
3. Smith, supra note 1, at 4.
4. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:1 (2d ed. 2001).
5. See infra Part I.B.4.
6. See infra Part I.C.
7. See, e.g., Mark Ishman, Comment, Computer Crimes and the Respondeat Superior
Doctrine: Employer Beware, 6 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 6 (2000) (discussing the problems
arising because of computers in the workplace while dedicating minimal discussion to
cybersmearing and providing no discussion of defamation).
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workplace have experienced tremendous growth in the last five years,"8
employers are also one of the traditional defendants in defamation actions
and the target of a recent increase in defamation suits brought by former
employees. 9 Many of these suits are based on unflattering reference letters
to potential employers or negative comments regarding former employees
to customers.'0 A growing trend in defamation lawsuits is to base such
claims on internal workplace communications which defame a co-worker,
including "the reasons for an employee's discharge, statements made in
internal performance evaluations, statements made during corporate office
meetings, in internal correspondence and memoranda, and in internal
security reports."" With access now available from the workplace to the
Internet, internal and external electronic bulletin boards, user groups,
internal and external e-mail, chat rooms, electronic libraries, and intranet
and extranet systems, 2 the door is wide open for the publication of
defamatory statements. Employees with ready access to these fora may
implicate an employer in tort liability with a simple click of the mouse.
Despite this potential liability, employers continue to provide this access
free of charge to their employees. 3
This brings us to the conflict at issue in this discussion. While we
credit employers for providing employees with free access, such access
comes at a price to the public because employers are one of the traditional
purveyors of defamatory comments. To complicate matters, Congress
stepped in to counteract judicial interference with Internet growth through
defamation suits by enacting the Communications Decency Act (CDA),
which is codified at § 230 of the United States Code. 14 In pertinent part, §
230 declares that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.' 5 This new Section provides broad
8. Id. at para. 5.
9. "[Alpproximately one-third of all defamation actions reported today are suits filed
by fired employees against their former employers. A prominent plaintiffs employment
lawyer recently put the matter succinctly: 'Spread the word. Every wrongful discharge must
be looked at as a defamation case."' SMOLLA, supra note 4, at § 15:2.
10. Id. at § 15:3.
11. Id. at § 15:4. See, e.g., Meloff v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2001)
(reviewing $1,250,000 defamation verdict based on a supervisor's e-mail suggesting credit
card fraud as the basis for plaintiff's discharge).
12. Interview with Gavin Day, Information Technology Director, Dataflux Corporation,
in Raleigh, N.C. (Nov. 11, 2000) (on file with Author).
13. Terry Schau, Internet Use: Here, There, and Everywhere, OCCUPATIONAL OuTLOOK
QUARTERLY, Winter 2000-01, at 42-44.
14. Communications Decency Act § 509,47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. V 1999).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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federal immunity for ISPs when defamatory material of a third party is
published using their services, 16 and further provides immunity should the
ISP exercise editorial control over the content by deleting potentially
offensive material. 17 The purpose of § 230, according to Congress, is to
deregulate the Internet and to allow ISPs to self-govern the content. 18
With the passage of § 230, Congress rendered employers immune for
the same tort which employers are so closely associated, opening the gates
to employer electronic defamation. At least one commentator suggests that
employers should not be capable of invoking the immunity available under
§ 230 because it would allow employers to defame with impunity.' 9 The
theory is that subjecting employers to potential liability will encourage
them to monitor and restrict the ability of employees to send defamatory e-
mails and Internet postings. 0
Unfortunately, this argument is misguided in many respects. First, it
is evident from the language and legislative history of the Act that
Congress intended employers to be covered under § 230.21 Indeed, holding
22employers liable would be directly contrary to the purposes of the CDA.
Moreover, § 230 immunity is only as broad as the language of the statute
allows, and employers are only immune under § 230 for content published
23by third parties. If the content is published by an employee acting within
the scope of his or her employment, then the employer would be liable as
the original publisher of the content under the doctrine of respondeat
24superior, not a third party, and thus the immunity will not apply. Finally,
the absence of immunity under § 230 places several federal interests at risk,
including labor relations and employee privacy. 5 Congress took the right
step in protecting the Internet as the electronic marketplace of ideas by
protecting employers under § 230.
Part I of this discussion will explore the relevant background
information regarding the extreme importance the Internet plays in
advancing the marketplace of ideas, and how the expansion of defamation
16. Id.
17. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2), (4); 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Cox).
19. See Michael H. Spencer, Defamatory E-Mail and Employer Liability: Why Razing
Zeran v. America Online is a Good Thing, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25 (Spring 2000).
20. Id.
21. See infra Part lI.A.
22. Id.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part llI.B.
25. See infra Part Il.C.
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law covering acts committed on the Internet restricts continued growth. In
addition, the underlying theories of liability under defamation tort law and
congressional reaction to the expansion of defamation law to cover the
Internet will be discussed. Next, Part II will demonstrate that Congress
intended employers to be immune under § 230 as ISPs and provide the
substantial justifications for such a position; namely, aside from the limited
immunity under § 230 because of vicarious liability, imposing liability on
employers in the absence of § 230 is inconsistent with other federal policies
and causes increased invasions of employee privacy. Finally, Part I
addresses a few objections to employer immunity.
II. BACKGROUND: THE INTERNET AND DEFAMATION LAW
The Internet serves to educate and advance Americans by providing a
vast electronic library of information and discourse. At the same time,
because of its structure, the Internet allows for the relatively unrestricted
and anonymous proliferation of defamatory and offensive material. Due to
users' anonymity, the law of defamation is capable of holding only ISPs
liable and provides an inadequate deterrent to protect against the harms of
defamation. Given the difficulty of government regulation of the Internet
and the potential harm to its continued growth by such regulation, Congress
demonstrated restraint and limited government interference with the
passage of § 230, while providing the Internet with the resources to self-
govern.
A. In Praise of the Internet
The success of the Internet spawned a new era in information
dissemination. Although the Internet failed to eliminate the socioeconomic
disparity between those who have access to information and those that do
not, this gap is slowly shrinking with the ability of the lesser advantaged to
26gain access through public facilities or the workplace. The Internet serves
as a broad forum for the expression of viewpoints and advertisement of
commercial goods.27 As the Supreme Court recognized, the Internet
"constitutes a vast platform from which to address and hear from a
worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and
buyers. 28 As Justice Stevens commented:
This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes not
only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and still
images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of
26. Smith, supra note 1, at 3.
27. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
28. Id.
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chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with
a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.29
In addition, commercial benefits of Internet access exist for
employers. "The benefits produced by using the Internet and e-mail in the
workplace are impressive."30 "However, with change come problems."
3
'
Despite the growth, the Court is also leery of government efforts to regulate
this forum. "[T]he growth of the Internet has been and continues to be
phenomenal. As a matter of constitutional tradition... we presume that
governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere
with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.' 32 Boundaries to this
marketplace exist and defamation law serves to restrict the flow of
falsehoods in this new medium by expanding to cover the Internet realm.
B. Defamation Law and the Internet Before Section 230
Since the underlying concern in this discussion involves defamation
law, a review of relevant tort theory is appropriate. Aside from the general
theories of defamation liability based on publication, the doctrine of
respondeat superior plays an especially important role in defamation law
when discussing employer liability. In addition, a review of court decisions
attempting to apply defamation law to the Internet prior to the enactment of
§ 230 will guide the discussion regarding the development of the statute.
1. The Basic Tort of Defamation
As with most tort law, the law of defamation is a "creature of state
tort law," and as such varies from state to state.33 "It must be confessed at
the beginning that there is a great deal of the law of defamation which
makes no sense.' ' 34 Despite the ambiguity, general principles may be
gleaned from the common law across the fifty states. The tort of
defamation is intended to protect the reputation of an individual within the
community.35 Spoken or written words which are injurious to a person's
reputation may subject the speaker or writer to liability. 3' Defamation
requires that a speaker of a defaming comment communicate the comment
29. Id. at 870.
30. Ishman, supra note 7, para. 6.
31. Susan M. Ballantine, Computer Network Trespasses: Solving New Problems with
Old Solutions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 209, 210 (2000).
32. Reno, 521 U.S. at 885.
33. SMOLLA, supra note 4, at § 1:1.
34. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 737 (4th ed. 1971).
35. Id.
36. Id. at751.
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37
to someone other than the person who is defamed. A plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of defamation when he demonstrates:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning [the plaintiff];
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher;
and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of the special
harm or the existence of special harm caused by publication.'s
The speaker must make the defaming statement to a third party, not
the person being defamed. 'This element of communication is given the
technical name of 'publication' .... It is not enough that the words are
uttered... unless they are in fact overheard."39 Publication of the
defamatory statement may be made intentionally, however negligent
publication is sufficient; strict liability for publication of a defamatory
statement is, relatively, a thing of the past.
40
2. Liability for Publishers Who Assist Speakers
Those who assist in publication of the defamatory statement are
generally seen as publishers for purposes of defamation law and thus
subject to liability. "[E]very one who takes part in the publication, as in the
case of the owner, editor, printer, vendor, or even carrier of a newspaper is
charged with publication .... ,,4 In addition, "[e]very repetition of the
defamation is a publication in itself.' 42 If someone repeats the defaming
37. Id. at 737.
38. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 558 (1976). The fourth element is the
requirement that the plaintiff show damages, either by demonstrating a pecuniary loss, or by
showing the defamation falls within a per se special harm for which the plaintiff is
automatically entitled to damages. Id at § 710; PROSSER, supra note 34, at 766; SMOLLA,
supra note 4, at § 15:18.
39. PROSSER, supra note 34, at 766.
40. Id. at 774. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1976). Important to
note is the definition of publication:
(1) Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act
to one other than the person defamed.
(2) One who intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he
knows to be exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control is subject to
liability for its continued publication.
Id. Arguably, paragraph (2) is entirely relevant to the discussion before us. Although
allowing the speaker to use the employer's Internet system or e-mail system may be akin to
paragraph (1), the employer, once it becomes aware of the posting, would be under an
obligation to remove such defamatory matter pursuant to paragraph (2), as construed in the
modem day world of the Internet.
41. PROSSER, supra note 34, at 768-69.
42. Id at 768; see also SMOLLA, supra note 4, at § 4:87.
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comment made by the speaker, that person is liable for publication as well.
The common law does distinguish between transmitters, or secondary
41publishers, and repeaters, or primary publishers. When a person or
organization broadcasts the defamatory material through newspaper, radio
or television, that person is considered a primary publisher and is as much
liable as the original publisher.44 However, if the person or organization
merely serves to transmit or distribute the defamatory material, sometimes
referred to as secondary publishers, that person is subject to a reduced
standard of liability.4' A transmitter (such as a message carrier delivering a
letter or the telephone company transmitting a phone call) or a distributor
(such as a bookstore selling a newspaper) will not be considered liable
absent a showing of knowledge on the part of the secondary publisher that
46the message was defamatory. Nevertheless, a primary publisher (such as a
caller on the phone or a newspaper) is charged with liability for negligent
acts of defamation.47
Applying these theories to today's technology, it would seem that an
ISP, which provides e-mail service, merely transmits or distributes
another's defamatory material. 41 Only the ISP transmitting an e-mail which
it knows to be defamatory would subject itself to liability for publication.
Yet, when the ISP allows a member to post the material on an ISP-
maintained electronic bulletin board or other forum, it becomes a primary
publisher, much like a newspaper.49 This analysis presents a legal dilemma
for ISPs because courts weigh the level of control an ISP maintains over
the medium when attempting to discern whether an ISP should be
considered a transmitter or a publisher for purposes of defamation law. 0
Therefore, the dilemma for ISPs concerned with both offensive material
and potential liability for that material, is that greater control over the
services in essence subjects the ISP to a lesser standard of culpability.
43. SMOLLA, supra note 4, at § 4:87.
44. Id. at § 4:92.
45. Id.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 581 (1976); SMOLLA, supra note 4, at § 4:92;
PROSSER, supra note 34, at 775.
47. PROSSER, supra note 34, at 774.
48. See, e.g., Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 683 N.Y.S.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(holding ISP to be common law transmitter of e-mail and therefore not subject to liability
for defamation).
49. See, e.g., Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1070-71
(D.S.D. 2001).
50. See infra Part I.B.4.
51. 141 CONG. REc. H22045 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
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3. The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior as Applied to Defamation
Under tort common law, employers are vicariously liable for the
actions of their employees which are performed within the scope of
employment.5 2 The employer's "vicarious liability, for conduct which is in
no way his own, extends to any and all tortious conduct of the servant
which is within the 'scope of the employment.' ', 3 If an employee, while
acting within the scope of his employment, defames another, the employer
will likely be the target of the defamation suit.54 The reasoning behind
vicarious liability of the employer is disputed.5 It is difficult to determine
whether the theory of respondeat superior simply imputes the act of
publishing from the agent to the principal, or whether the employer is liable
as a matter of policy for the tortious acts of the servant irregardless. s6
Nonetheless, respondeat superior charges the employer with the tortious
acts of the employee within the scope of employment.
4. Judicial Decisions on Intemet Defamation Before the CDA
In one of the first court decisions to consider defamation and the
Internet, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,7 a New York federal district
court considered the liability of an ISP for an online newsletter published
through its system.5' The case involved the defendant CompuServe, a
national ISP which provided access for subscribers to an "on-line general
information service" including an "electronic library. ' 59 The electronic
library included bulletin boards, online conferencing, and topical
60databases. One of the publications available in the electronic library was a
daily newsletter called "Rumorville" which provided reports on
journalists. 6' Rumorville was operated entirely by an independent
52. Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not
unexpectable by the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957).
53. PROSSER, supra note 34, at 460.
54. SMOLLA, supra note 4, at § 15:23.
55. PROSSER, supra note 34, at 459.
56. Id.
57. 776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
58. Id. at 137-38.
59. Id. at 137.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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contractor with complete control over the publication process who then
62
uploaded the publication to CompuServe for access. The plaintiff, a
corporation which itself published an electronic newspaper on the
television news and radio industries, was allegedly defamed by Rumorville
on several occasions. 61 Plaintiff alleged claims against CompuServe as a
publisher of the defamation. 64 The court, based on the lack of control
CompuServe held over Rumorville, granted summary judgment to
CompuServe. The court declared CompuServe to be a mere electronic
66distributor, therefore subject to the lower standard traditionally "applied
to a public library, book store, or newsstand .... Holding an ISP to be a
publisher "would impose an undue burden on the free flow of
• o, , 68
information. The court determined that distributor liability could only be
imposed on CompuServe if "it knew or had reason to know of the allegedly
defamatory Rumorville statements., 69 Due to its lack of control over
Rumorville, CompuServe would not be subject to publisher liability, but
could potentially be held liable as a distributor of defamation. 70 The
unfortunate result of such a case is to encourage an ISP like CompuServe to
exercise no control over its content and to avoid any attempt to investigate
possible defamatory statements.
71
A case with more negative ramifications for ISPs emerged out of a
New York trial court. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co.,72 the
state court determined that an ISP could be held liable as a publisher as
long as it exercised sufficient control over the allegedly defamatory
content.73 Prodigy hired leaders to participate in electronic "[bulletin] board
discussions" and "undertake promotional efforts to encourage usage .... 74
One of Prodigy's bulletin boards was "Money Talk," which was led by
Charles Epstein.7' The plaintiff established that Prodigy advertised itself as
a family-oriented ISP, claiming it "exercised editorial control over the
content of messages posted on ... bulletin boards," and maintained content
62. Id.
63. Id. at 138.
64. Id.
65. 776 F.Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
66. Id. at 140.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 141.
70. Id.
71. 141 CONG. REc. H22045 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
72. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Supp. 1995).
73. Id. at *4.
74. Id. at *1.
75. Id.
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Guidelines which empowered leaders to edit statements before they became
public on the boards.76 On summary judgment, the court determined that
Prodigy served as a publisher, distinguishing Cubby because Prodigy
advertised its editorial control over content, "implemented this control
through its automatic software screening program," and required board
leaders to enforce content Guidelines.77 "By actively utilizing technology
and manpower... PRODIGY is clearly making decisions as to content,
and such decisions constitute editorial control."78 Thus, the court held
Prodigy to be a publisher for the purposes of plaintiff's defamation action
based on the extent of control Prodigy maintained over the bulletin board.79
C. Congress Responds to Protect Expansion of the Internet
While Stratton Oakmont was pending in the trial court, Congress
started considering legislation to alter the application of defamation law to
the Internet.80 The CDA was a small part of a major legislative effort to
overhaul telecommunications legislation. The omnibus act, entitled the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, targeted various areas of the
telecommunications and cable industries." Congress was concerned with
the proliferation of obscene material on the Internet and codified Title V of
82the Act, the CDA, in an attempt to the curb such proliferation.
As part of the CDA, Congress sought to amend Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934!' to include a new § 230 entitled "Protection
for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material. 84 The
underlying purpose of this section, dubbed the Cox-Wyden Amendment,
was to encourage private ISPs to screen out offensive material. 8' To
accomplish this task, Congress immunized ISPs from liability for removing
that which the ISP deemed "to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable."86 In part,because of the decision in Stratton Oakmnont, Congress felt it necessary to
76. Id. at *2.
77. Id. at *4.
78. Id. (internal citations omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id. at *5.
81. 141 CONG. REC. H21999 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
82. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858 (1997).
83. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
84. 141 CONG. Rc. H22044 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); 47
U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. V 2000).
85. 141 CONG. REc. H22045 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
86. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
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immunize ISPs from potential liability as a publisher.87 The New York
court in Stratton Oakmont based its decision on the control Prodigy
88
maintained over its system. Since the ISP maintained a sufficient level of
control, it could be held liable for the material published through the
system. 9 Congress realized the potential impact of such a decision:
discouraging ISPs from controlling and screening the system because of the
potential liability a court might impose.90 Therefore, paragraph (c) of § 230
protects ISPs by declaring that no ISP "shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider." 9' Essentially, § 230 would entrust screening of the Internet to
private industry.
The House regarded the Senate's version of Internet protections,
known as the Exon Amendment, as constitutionally questionable. 92 Instead
of the Senate's effort toward government regulation under the Exon
Amendment, the House's Cox-Wyden Amendment would "encourage
people like Prodigy, like CompuServe,. . . to do everything possible for us,
the customer, to help us control, at the portals of our computer, at the front
door of our house, what comes in and what our children see."93 "[T]he
Internet is the shining star of the information age, and Government censors
must not be allowed to spoil its promise., 94 As Congressman Cox stated,
when advocating for the passage of § 230, "[t]he message today should be
from this Congress we embrace this new technology, we welcome the
opportunity for education and political discourse that it offers for all of
US. '
95
Congressman Cox criticized the Exon Amendment for having
"content regulation by the Federal Government of what is on the
Internet... ."9' As he explained, the new § 230 would reverse the legal
system's "massive disincentive for the people who might best help us
control the Internet to do so" by overruling the Stratton Oakmont
87. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); 141 CONG. REC. H22045 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Cox).
88. See supra text accompanying note 70.
89. Id.
90. See 141 CONG. REc. H22045 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
91. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
92. 141 CONG. REC. Hi 160 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Eshoo). The
Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the House's assessment of the Exon Amendment,
finding it an unconstitutional infringement on the First Amendment. Reno, 521 U.S. at 849.
93. 141 CONG. REC. H22045 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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decision.97 The Cox-Wyden Amendment, by allowing ISPs to regulate and
control the material disseminated over the computer system, would be the
most effective tool for screening minors from indecent material.
The CDA went to a conference committee to hammer out the
differences between the two congressional Houses. At the completion of
the conference, both the Exon Amendment and the Cox-Wyden
Amendment remained as separate sections of the CDA.98 The conference
report provided the definitive legislative history on the CDA. The primary
purpose of § 230 was "to promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services and... to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists .. unfettered by
Federal or State regulation."99 As a result, the deregulation was intended "to
remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and
filtering technologies."' 00 While the larger concern of Congress during
debate seemed to be balancing the interest of protecting children from
offensive material against maintaining a deregulated Internet, it is apparent
from the legislative history that Congress found decisions such as Stratton
Oakmont to be highly destructive to Internet growth.'' As a result,
Congress sought to immunize most of those who encourage the
development of a responsible Internet-the service providers. The report
clearly expressed that under § 230, "[t]hese protections apply to all
interactive computer services... including non-subscriber systems such as
those operated by many businesses for employee use."' 102 Congress hoped
that by providing broad immunity to all forms of ISPs, the Internet would
engage in self-regulation, thus screening minors from offensive material.
At least one court has interpreted § 230 to preempt both Stratton
Oakmont and Cubby. In Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,'03 an unidentified
subscriber of America Online ("AOL") placed advertisements for tasteless
products on AOL bulletin boards shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing
for "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts."104 The advertisements informed readers
to contact "Ken" at the phone number listed. The phone number listed onthe ad was Zeran's, who then received a flood of phone calls, some of
97. Id.
98. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223 with 47 U.S.C. § 230. See also LIR CONF. REP. No. 140-
458, at 194 (1996).
99. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2).
100. Id. § 230(b)(4).
101. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
102. Id.
103. 129 F.3d 327, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1997).
104. Id. at 329.
105. Id.
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which threatened his life.1 °6 Zeran contacted AOL and requested it remove
the advertisements, which AOL failed to do.'0 7 When Zeran sued, AOL
asserted § 230 as a defense to the action." The Fourth Circuit, reviewing a
judgment on the pleadings in favor of AOL, rejected plaintiff's argument
that AOL acted as a distributor and therefore did not fall within § 230's
immunity.'0 9 The court held that "[e]ven distributors are considered to be
publishers for purposes of defamation law."" 0 "Congress recognized the
threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and
burgeoning Internet medium .... Section 230 was enacted, in part, to
maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to
keep government interference in the medium to a minimum."'' Although
Zeran relied on Stratton Oakmont and Cubby to show a legal distinction,
the court found those cases created different standards of liability for "the
specific type of publisher concerned."' 2 According to the Fourth Circuit,
even if the entity at issue was merely acting as a distributor, the protections
of § 230 applied with equal force." 3
Another federal court determined that limitations to § 230 immunity
do exist. In Blumenthal v. Drudge,' '4 the plaintiffs, two White House
employees, brought suit against Matt Drudge, the writer of an electronic
gossip column entitled the "Drudge Report" and AOL, the report's online
publisher." 5 Drudge published allegedly defamatory statements regarding
plaintiffs' history of spousal abuse.1 6 Drudge posted these statements on
his Web site and sent them via e-mail to thousands of Drudge
subscribers.1 7 The statements were also made available to approximately
nine million AOL subscribers, by a contract between Drudge and AOL. '
Although Drudge and AOL later retracted the story, the plaintiffs followed
through with their suit." 9 AOL moved for summary judgment in part
claiming the protections of § 230.120 The court, while agreeing with AOL
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 129 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
110. Id.
111. Id. at330.
112. Id. at 332.
113. Id. at 334.
114. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
115. Id. at 46-48.
116. Id. at46.
117. Id. at47.
118. Id.
119. Id. at48.
120. Id at 48-49.
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and granting summary judgment, noted that "no person, other than Drudge
himself, edited, checked, verified, or supervised the information
[published].' 21 The court recognized that "wisely or not, [Congress] made
the legislative judgment to effectively immunize providers of interactive
computer services from civil liability in tort with respect to material
disseminated by them but created by others.' ' 2 However, the court agreed
with AOL that "there is no evidence to support the view.., that Drudge is
or was an employee or agent of AOL." 23 Moreover, AOL acknowledged
"that Section 230(c)(1) would not immunize AOL with respect to any
information AOL developed or created."' 24 Both the parties and the court
seemed to realize that § 230 did not immunize AOL from liability if the
defamation action was based on statements made by AOL's employees.
III. JUSTIFYING EMPLOYER IMMUNITY
Falling to provide employer immunity under § 230 for an employee's
act outside the scope of his or her employment is directly contrary to the
express language and legislative history of the CDA. Employers will not
receive limitless immunity under § 230, but rather the same level of
immunity available in the offline world. Finally, absent statutory immunity,
employers will be trapped in a quagmire of conflicting federal policies and
interests and forced to invade both employee privacy and the freedom of
the Internet marketplace.
A. Congressional Intent to Include Employers
The legislative history surrounding § 230 indicates Congress's intent
to protect all ISPs, including commercial providers, employers, and public
facilities like libraries. According to Representative Cox, § 230 "will
protect computer Good Samaritans, online service providers, anyone who
provides a front end to the Internet."'25 The conference report, published
concurrently with the conference agreeing to a version of the CDA,
specifically comments that employer-operated ISPs are to be covered by §
230. "[Section 230's] protections apply to all interactive computer services,
as defined in [§ 230], including non-subscriber systems such as those
operated by many businesses for employee use."'2 1 In addition, the Senate
121. 992 F. Supp. 44,50 (D.D.C. 1998).
122. Id. at 49.
123. Id. at 50.
124. Id.
125. 141 CONG. REc. H22045 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox)
(emphasis added).
126. H.R. CoNF. Re. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
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counterpart to § 230, the Exon Amendment which ultimately became § 223
of the CDA, provides specific defenses for employers who maintain
ISPs.
127
The definitions for § 230 indicate Congress's intent to include any
possible service provider. In pertinent part, § 230 protects "interactive
computer service[s]" from publisher liability.121 Such service is defined as
"any information service, system, or access software provider that provides
or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions.' 29 The definition clearly does not limit itself to
commercial providers who charge a fee for users to gain access. The statute
makes no mention that the service be for-profit or for customers as a
requirement of coverage. 3 The definition seems to further include intranet
systems, that is, systems which are for internal use by the users only.' The
most popular of such systems are intranets used by large employers to
allow for internal communication between employees. 112 The broad
definitions under § 230 leave little question that Congress intended to
protect employers.
133
In addition, Congress specifically conditioned immunity under § 230
on a requirement that the defamatory material be provided by another
information content provider. Congress intended to encourage ISPs to
provide access to the Internet and self-regulate the medium, but in no way
intended to immunize those ISPs for their own defamatory information.
3 4
127. 47 U.S.C. § 223.
128. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Although § 230(d) regarding obligations of an ISP under the statute mentions
customers, this section was added after the conference and it was not likely the intent of the
amendment to eliminate employers from coverage under § 230(c). While all other
regulations under § 230 mention "users," paragraph (d), added later in the process, is the
sole section which uses the term "customers." Courts may sever paragraph (d) to only apply
to for-profit ISP operations or interpret paragraph (d) to cover employers. If paragraph (d)
does not apply, then employees would be again without notice of monitoring. But see infra
note 144 (discussing proposed Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act).
131. Interview with Gavin Day, supra note 12 (stating that because the statute
specifically covers "computer access by multiple users to a computer server," it indicates
coverage of internal computer networks).
132. Id.
133. Caitlin Garvey, Note, The New Corporate Dilemma: Avoiding Liability in the Age
of Internet Technology, 25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 135 (1999) (finding ambiguity as to
coverage but ultimately concluding functional definition of ISP must cover employers
providing Internet access).
134. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 50.
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ISPs would only be immune from liability as publisher for defamatory
content created or developed by third parties and would be encouraged to
self-govern the material transmitted through their services. 35 By definition,
the creator or developer of the defamatory material is liable as a publisher
under § 230.136 Prior to § 230 and the Internet, employers were not liable
for defamation of third parties. Only when the employer created or
developed the defamatory material, through the actions of its employees,
was it liable for the defamation. Congress intended to carry that same
standard into the electronic realm. Construing § 230 to provide blanket
immunity to employers for the actions of their employees does violence to
the language of the statute and the intent of Congress. Protecting employers
from liability for employee defamation outside the scope of employment is
consistent with defamation law and the CDA.
B. Liability Under Respondeat Superior Despite Section 230
Liability as a publisher is intended to discourage third parties from
distributing the defaming comment of another. For this reason alone, it is
entirely inconsistent to impose liability on the employer as publisher when
a defaming statement is made utilizing the employer's system. If the
comment is made in the scope of the speaker's employment, for example a
supervisor who writes an e-mall recommendation regarding a former
employee in which he defames the former employee, then the employer
would be vicariously liable for the actions of the employee under common
law. 137 As the statute's explicit language makes clear, an employer-provider
is immune as a publisher for "information provided by another information
content provider.' ' 138 Employers, traditionally corporations which are
fictional entities of the state, may only act through their employees.
Therefore, the employer is already subject to liability for the defamation-
not as a publisher-but through vicarious liability as a principal under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.139 Material published through the
135. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 140-458, at 194 (1996).
136. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 50.
137. PROSSER, supra note 34, at 460 (an employer's "vicarious liability, for conduct
which is in no way his own, extends to any and all tortious conduct of the [employee] which
is within the 'scope of employment."). The most likely and common fodder for defamation
suits is a supervisor's post-termination comment regarding the reason for the plaintiff s
termination. See, e.g., Meloff v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (defamation
suit based on supervisor's e-mail to fellow supervisors discussing plaintiff's termination for
credit card fraud).
138. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
139. Although it may be suggested, it seems without merit that Congress intended to
preempt any and all common law defamation theories when enacting § 230. See, e.g.,
Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 683 N.Y.S.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that ISP
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employer's system by an employee acting within the scope of his
employment is not information provided by another, but is information
provided by the employer and thus not immune from liability. A finding
that an agent of the ISP, within his authority, defamed another is a finding
that the ISP itself defamed the person. This conduct is not entitled to
immunity under § 230.140 Imposing respondeat superior liability for
defamation on an employer's system is entirely consistent with the statute
because it does not discourage employer control over the system.' 4'
Vicarious liability has always existed for employers in the offline world,
and employers are held responsible under tort law for the actions of their
employees within the scope of employment. Without respondeat superior
liability, an employer must still maintain control over the actions of the
employees, not only to advance his or her interests, but also because of
other potential liabilities. This impetus does not exist in the context of a
company and a customer, which is the situation of other ISPs when facing
potential liability for the actions of their users.
On the other hand, if the speaker's defaming comment is not made
within the scope of employment,142 imposing liability for such a comment
made without the employer's control or acquiescence seems entirely
inconsistent with the principles of the CDA. Moreover, employers should
not have free reign to prohibit certain e-mails despite their defamatory
nature. In this case, employers are just as blameless for defamatory
comments unrelated to work made by employees as commercial service
providers are for comments made by customers. While employers will be
held liable for defamation under traditional notions of tort law should the
employee's comment take place in the course of employment, employers
will be immune from utterly unrelated comments that happen to be made
on the employee's business account as opposed to his personal account at
home.
not liable for defamatory e-mail because ISP served only as common law transmitter and
therefore was immune without proceeding to second issue of immunity under § 230).
140. Where the line is drawn between another information content provider and the
employee as agent of the employer may be difficult at times. It will basically boil down to
whether an employee provided content as opposed to merely editing what others provided.
See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.4 (10th
Cir. 2000) (immunizing defendant for exercising editorial control but noting "that § 230
would not immunize defendant with respect to information defendant developed or created
by itself").
141. Section 230 preempts state law only if state law is inconsistent with the Section. 47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) ("No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.").
142. PROSSER, supra note 34, at 461 ('If the [employee] steps outside of his employment
to do some act for himself, not connected with the [employer]'s business, there is no more
responsibility for what he does than for the acts of any stranger.").
[Vol. 54
EMPLOYER IMMUNITY
C. Imposing Liability Contrary to Federal Policy
Numerous federal laws govern the workplace, and each federal law
imposes new policies and requirements on the employer. In certain
situations, denying employers immunity under § 230 of the CDA will
compound potential liability or will create inconsistent federal policies
leading to conflicting legal requirements. Maintaining immunity as
envisioned by Congress, however, will prevent these problems and further
the goals of the statute. Even though some suggest that, by imposing
liability, Congress will encourage employers to closely monitor the actions
of their employees, this goal will be largely illusory given the numerous
competing and conflicting employer obligations. While in some situations
the law encourages employers to monitor e-mails sent in the workplace,
other limitations restrict the power of employers over their own system.
In some instances, federal policy favors employer monitoring of
employee e-mail. Employers frequently monitor employees to maintain
productivity and to ensure information security.143 Employers may also
need to monitor and investigate employee use of e-mail and Internet access
in order to take corrective action if made aware of e-mails which may be
considered harassing. Employers are subject to liability under Title VII for
failing to reign in harassing e-mails sent to a female co-worker or off-color
remarks sent to an ethnic minority. 44 In either situation, the employer will
be held liable for acquiescing to the hostile work environment created by e-
mails. Under Title VII, an employer is obligated to eradicate the hostile
environment upon becoming aware of the activity.1 46 In this case, § 230
would immunize the employer from removing the offensive e-mails which
Title VII already encourages an employer to monitor in the first place.
In other circumstances, encouraging employers to continuously
monitor employee e-mail limits employees' expectations of privacy in the
workplace.147 Federal and state law has, in many ways, failed to protect
private-sector employees' privacy in regard to intra-office electronicS • 148
communication. Although the federal Electronic Communications
143. Hall Adams III et al., E-Mail Monitoring in the Workplace: The Good, the Bad and
the Ugly, 67 DEF. CouNs. J. 32, 33 (2000).
144. Garvey, supra note 133, at 134.
145. See, e.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1996) (Title VII sexual
harassment claim based upon supervisor's e-mails requesting sexual favors).
146. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
147. J.M. Balkin, Essay: Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REv.
2295, 2298 (1999) ("Because employers have no general interest in preserving employee
speech rights unrelated to efficiency, they will impose regulations as broad as they think
necessary to insulate themselves from liability.").
148. But see Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (1999) (bill
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Privacy Act (ECPA) 149 curbed unauthorized monitoring of electronic
communications, it had minimal impact on private sector offices.' 50 This is
largely due to the statutory definitions limiting the coverage to more public
communications systems, not privately-maintained networks.15' In addition,
broad and ambiguous exceptions to coverage likely leave employers with
many options in shielding themselves from potential liability under the
ECPA. 52 As a result, many fear that the new danger of the technological
workplace is the "electronic sweatshop" where employees are subject to
constant electronic monitoring.'53 Advocates of excluding employers from
§ 230 immunity suggest that increased employee monitoring should be
encouraged, 54 but this seems to call for limitless intrusion on individual
employees' privacy because few state or federal protections exist. Most
scholars agree that there are relatively little to no restraints set on
employers regarding electronic monitoring.' 55 Encouraging an increase in
such monitoring serves only to increase the detriment to employees'
privacy.
A rule which imposes liability on employers as publishers contradicts
federal labor policy and causes conflicting liabilities for employers. The
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)156 encourages employees to engage
in collective concerted activity for the purpose of improving terms and
conditions of employment. 57 Concerted activity includes collective
discussion and communication by employees of various work-related
matters. '' E-mail now serves a critical role in the ability of an employee to
discuss matters with fellow employees.9  Unfortunately, defamatory
comments targeting fellow employees or members of management may
often occur in e-mails discussing working conditions.' 60 Without § 230, the
advocating setting notice requirements involving private employer monitoring of e-mail and
Internet use).
149. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2710 (1994).
150. F. LAWRENCE STREET, LAW OF THE INTERNET 100 (1998); FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 84 (1997). See generally PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R.
REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW ch. 13 (1996).
151. STREET, supra note 150, at 100.
152. CATE, supra note 150, at 84.
153. Adams et al., supra note 143, at 34.
154. Spencer, supra note 19, at *23.
155. CATE, supra note 150, at 86.
156. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
157. Id. § 157.
158. NRLB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 825 (1984).
159. Office of General Counsel, Advice Memorandum (Feb. 23, 1998) (on file with Pratt
& Whitney).
160. For the most part, defamatory comments made in the course of concerted activity
are protected under the NLRA. Old Dominion Branch 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
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employer may be liable to both the defamed person in tort, and subject to
an unfair labor practice under the NLRA for attempting to remove, erase or
limit such e-mails, or discipline the sender. 16 Liability under the NLRA is
not dependent on the employer being a unionized workplace, rather it exists
even in the absence of a union so long as the activity falls within the
definition of concerted activity. Potential tort liability forces employers
to restrict the use of electronic media to limited business purposes. Yet,
such a trend is contrary to the rising jurisprudence suggesting that denying
an employee the right to e-mail fellow employees regarding working
conditions is a violation of the employee's Section 7 rights,16 and therefore
an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1).' 64 Employers are between a
"rock and a hard place" without some form of immunity under § 230.
Congress, by immunizing employers under § 230, requires the victim of
defamation to seek redress in court against the speaker and allows the
employer to avoid restriction on protected concerted activity.
Moreover, new trends in labor law suggest that unions will continue
to increase their use of the Internet to communicate with members and to
provide resources. Scholars and members of the labor movement suggest
that unions will begin using the Internet and its various resources including
bulletin boards to create reference systems and training programs for
members. Employees will be able to obtain information regarding
potential job opportunities, aside from the possibility of communicating
globally with other employees regarding working conditions and rights
under labor law. If employers are forced to set restrictive rules regarding
usage of Internet and e-mail, this valuable new tool of the labor movement
would be eliminated. Shielding employers from liability under § 230
therefore encourages employers to provide unfettered access to the
electronic media and, in turn, spawns the use of the electronic media for
concerted activity.
Even if the defamatory comment made by the employee is not work-
related, and thus not covered by the NLRA, the employer may open the
AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 277-78 (1974) ("Vigorous exercise of this right 'to
persuade other employees to join' must not be stifled by the threat of liability for the
overenthusiastic use of rhetoric or the innocent mistake of fact. Thus, the Board has
concluded that statements ... are protected by § 7, even if they are defamatory and prove to
be erroneous, unless made with knowledge of their falsity.").
161. Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 30 (1997).
162. Id.
163. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994).
165. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology:
Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 24 (2001).
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door to additional tort liability by attempting to discipline the employee.
Although employees are generally considered "at-will" and thus may be
discharged for any reason or no reason at all, the law has recognized
exceptions to the power of employers over the employment contract.166 In
particular, the law may readily restrict the ability of employers to discharge
- 167
employees for private non-work-related misconduct. As a result, a court
may be inclined to reinstate with back pay or award damages to an
employee discharged by an employer for making defamatory statements
unrelated to work. Essentially, the employer in many situations is limited in
its capacity to regulate the speech of its employees. While some cause for
concern regarding employer immunity under § 230 is based on the power
of the employer to allow employees to defame with impunity, in many
instances the employer may be powerless to stop such activities, while in
other situations, the employer would still be liable despite § 230.
D. Responding to the Objections
Critics of covering employers under § 230 point to the obvious
concern that employers are the root of defamatory evil. That is to say,
employers are notorious for being the defendants in defamation actions. 68
Whether this is because employers are a "deep pocket" or the true
perpetrator of the defamation is irrelevant. As one scholar argues,
providing immunity for employers in the context of a digital defamation
action will lead to a parade of horribles. 69 "[E]mployers will allow
employees to say and post anything, since employers will be immune from
liability."'70 As Professor Michael H. Spencer properly notes, "[t]he only
restriction on this absolution would be in situations in which [ISPs]
themselves are the information content provider.' 7' Therefore, there is
some limitation on the extent of immunity under § 230.
This begs the question: When may an ISP, such as Prodigy, be itself
the information content provider as Professor Spencer suggests? The
answer is simple under the law of agency and in light of Blumenthal."2 An
ISP is incapable of acting as an entity and therefore it must act through its
agents. Drawing from Blumenthal and common law principles previously
166. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947,
947-53 (1984).
167. N.Y. LAB. LAw § 201-d (McKinney Supp. 2001-2002) (prohibiting discrimination
in employment based upon employee conduct outside workplace).
168. See supra text accompanying note 9.
169. Spencer, supra note 19, at *17.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 49-50.
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discussed, the ISP would only be liable if an employee of the company
"developed or created" the information content, and thus the defamatory
statement. In absence of this liability, there would be no situation in which
any ISP could be held liable for defamation despite the language of § 230.
To construe § 230 otherwise would make "another" entirely superfluous in
the statutory language. Certainly, the court in Blumenthal did not presume
that the entity known as AOL could actually develop or create defamation
without the assistance of an agent, namely one of its employees.
Professor Spencer poses an important hypothetical: "Assume that an
employee who is part of the employer's hiring committee sends an e-mail
to others in the company making disparaging remarks about a potential
candidate for employment. The remarks, though untrue, keep the candidate
from finding employment."' 73 The candidate discovers the statement andS 174
brings suit against the employee and employer. In this situation, despite
the existence of § 230, the employer is liable for the defamatory statement
of the employee based upon respondeat superior. The definition of scope
of employment is so broad that it includes any act of the employee within
"the 'same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct
authorized."", 175 Indeed, vicarious liability may be imposed "[e]ven when
the conduct is forbidden by the employer.' ' 76 As an internal memorandum
stating untrue reasons for an employee's discharge is imputed to the
employer, false comments made by a hiring committee member
regarding a candidate are just as equally charged against the employer.
Such a comment subjects the employer to liability regardless of whether it
is sent via internal memorandum or by e-mail. That is because § 230 and
the court decisions make clear that an entity, and not one of its employees
acting within the scope of his employment, is protected by the statute for
the defamation of a third party.
IV. CONCLUSION
The CDA, through § 230, demonstrates congressional intent to protect
employers who provide Internet service as a benefit of employment from
potential liability and to encourage employers to responsibly monitor their
services. Denying employers coverage under § 230 increases the likelihood
of intensified electronic workplace monitoring and requires an invasion of
employee rights and privacy. At the same time, employers are discouraged
173. Spencer, supra note 19, at *19.
174. Md
175. SMOLLA, supra note 4, at § 15:23.
176. Id.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
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from providing access for their employees because of the potential liability,
and thus possibly deny persons who might not otherwise be able to afford
such access. Employers will not escape blame where it is due, because §
230 does not permit an ISP to escape its own defamatory actions.
With § 230, Congress struck with a broad stroke the possibility of
defamation liability for ISPs when the defamatory comment originates with
a third party. As the history and language make clear, the intent of
Congress in drafting such broad language was to cover all potential
providers in order to foster continued unregulated growth of the Internet
while encouraging all providers to limit the amount of offensive material
distributed. Protecting employers will further Congress's goal of protecting
the e-marketplace of ideas.
